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THE BEIJING TREATY ON AUDIOVISUAL 
PERFORMANCES: HOW STOPPING DIGITAL 
PIRACY MAY COST THE WORLD FREE 
EXPRESSION 
Michael A. Shinall* 
Abstract: The Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances grants, for the 
first time, international rights to performers to protect their work in an 
audiovisual medium. This is a step forward in protecting audiovisual me-
dia from international piracy or infringement, but comes at a cost. While 
performers’ economic rights are kept in check by fair use defenses (fa-
vored uses designed to promote the creation of new works) performers’ 
moral rights from the Beijing Treaty contain no counterbalancing de-
fense. This Comment argues that without this counterbalancing defense, 
performers may assert these moral rights against other artists unchecked, 
consequently chilling the free expression that copyright laws are sup-
posed to foster. 
Introduction 
 On June 24, 2012, member states of the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO) adopted the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual 
Performances (Beijing Treaty).1 The Treaty creates copyright protec-
tion for “performers” —people such as actors and singers—in audiovis-
ual works, including film, television, or video.2 The Beijing Treaty aims 
to (1) protect the images of performers in media and (2) prevent dis-
tortion of their performances.3 Because the Beijing Treaty aims to curb 
                                                                                                                      
* Michael A. Shinall is the Senior Editor for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. He would like to thank Professor David S. Olson, Vanessa Arslanian, and 
Paul Caligiuri for their valuable critiques and comments. He would also like to thank his 
parents, Michael and Lisa Shinall, for their endless support and encouragement. 
1 WIPO Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances Is Concluded, World Intell. Prop. Org. 
( June 26, 2012), http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2012/article_0013.html. 
2 Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances pmbl., arts. 2–3, June 24, 2012, WIPO 
Doc. AVP/DC/20 [hereinafter Beijing Treaty], available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/ 
mdocs/copyright/en/avp_dc/avp_dc_20.pdf; WIPO Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Perform-
ances Is Concluded, supra note 1. 
3 See Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 5–10; William New, WIPO Lauded for New Beijing 
Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, Intell. Prop. Watch (June 29, 2012, 4:54 AM), http:// 
www.ip-watch.org/2012/06/29/wipo-lauded-for-new-beijing-treaty-on-audiovisual-perform 
ances/; WIPO Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances Is Concluded, supra note 1. 
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international digital piracy4 by granting moral rights to performers 
without a counterbalancing fair use type of defense, it curbs the free 
expression that copyright laws are supposed to foster.5 
 Copyright protection generally is designed to promote creation of 
new work by offering authors exclusive rights in their works.6 These 
rights, however, are typically kept in check by “fair use” defenses— ex-
emptions from infringement that promote favored uses or the creation 
of new work.7 
 Part I of this Comment discusses WIPO treaties prior to the Beijing 
Treaty. Part II discusses the new rights the Beijing Treaty creates—
including moral rights—and examines comparable provisions found in 
the Copyright Law of China. Part III argues that granting moral rights 
to performers creates a subjective standard, and without a counterbal-
ancing fair use or parody defense, will lead to international chilling of 
free expression. Part III then uses the Copyright Law of China to dem-
onstrate how countries without a fair use provision for moral rights will 
treat moral rights claims. 
I. Background 
 The Beijing Treaty is the first WIPO international treaty adopted 
since the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) in 
1996.8 The WPPT, a precursor to the Beijing Treaty, provides two types 
of copyright protection to performers.9 First, it protects any fixation 
                                                                                                                      
4 The words “piracy” and “infringement” are used interchangeably by courts and many 
scholars. See Melville B. Nimmer, Inroads on Copyright Protection, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1125, 1127 
n.14 (1951). Similarly, I refer to piracy, but intend to include “infringement” within this 
meaning. See id. 
5 See Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, pmbl., art. 5; cf. Copyright Law of the People’s Re-
public of China art. 22 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 
26, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Copyright Law of China], available at http:// 
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=186569 (protecting moral rights for copyright 
holders, but lacking any defense against a moral rights claim); David S. Olson, First 
Amendment Based Copyright Misuse, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 537, 540 (2010) (noting that 
copyright is intended to promote the creation of new work); Mary Morrone, Note, Moral 
Rights and Classical Liberal Theory: The Interplay of Two Philosophies in Copyright Law, 6 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & Liberty 532, 549 (2012) (stating that fear of moral rights liability may chill free 
expression). 
6 See Olson, supra note 5. 
7 See Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use, 54 Wash. 
& Lee L. Rev. 33, 72–74 (1997). 
8 New, supra note 3; WIPO Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances Is Concluded, supra 
note 1. 
9 See generally WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 
U.N.T.S. 203 [hereinafter WPPT]. 
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(placing in a tangible medium) of the sounds of their performances, 
other than those in audiovisual works.10 Specifically, performers have 
economic rights to make fixed performances available commercially, 
and reproduce, distribute, and rent their work.11 Second, performers 
have moral rights protection—the right to prevent alterations or distor-
tions of their performances.12 
 The WPPT’s economic rights address the rapidly growing problem 
of digital piracy, the illegal file sharing and reproduction of copyright-
protected materials.13 Previously, authors were the only holders of eco-
nomic rights, but under the WPPT, performers can also collect revenue 
for the distribution of their work and take legal action against any party 
that violates their economic rights.14 The WPPT, however, contained 
gaps that left audiovisual performers unprotected.15 Many proponents 
of stronger copyright protection pushed WIPO to close this gap.16 To-
day, digital piracy costs the entertainment industry billions of dollars.17 
If copyright owners cannot enforce their rights, the incentive to create 
is arguably lost.18 WIPO needed to act to protect audiovisual works on 
an international level.19 
                                                                                                                      
10 Id. arts. 2(b), 6–10. 
11 Id. arts. 6–10. 
12 Id. art. 5; Susan A. Mort, The WTO, WIPO & The Internet: Confounding the Borders of 
Copyright and Neighboring Rights, 8 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 173, 206 
(1997). 
13 Mort, supra note 12, at 189–91. Previous treaties did not adequately address the right 
of “distribution” and “temporary reproductions,” a mechanic that is prevalent in storing 
copies of digital work in a computer’s memory. See Rebecca F. Martin, The WIPO Perform-
ances and Phonograms Treaty: Will the U.S. Whistle a New Tune?, 44 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 
157, 160–61 (1997). 
14 WPPT, supra note 9, arts. 6–10; see Mort, supra note 12, at 205. 
15 See Adler Bernard, The Proposed New WIPO Treaty for Increased Protection of Audiovisual 
Performers: Its Provisions and Its Domestic and International Implications, 12 Fordham Intell. 
Prop. & Media Ent. L.J. 1089, 1094 (2002); Tilman Lüder, The Next Ten Years in E.U. Copy-
right: Making Markets Work, 18 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1, 8 n.30 (2007). 
16 WIPO Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances Is Concluded, supra note 1. 
17 See Eduardo Porter, The Perpetual War: Pirates and Creators, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 2012, at 
SR10; Ben Sisario, Net Providers Plan Penalties to Slow Piracy, N.Y. Times, July 8, 2011, at A1. 
18 See New, supra note 3; Maureen Ryan, Fair Use and Academic Expression: Rhetoric, Real-
ity, and Restriction on Academic Freedom, 8 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 541, 545 (1999) (out-
lining incentive theory of copyright, where the author’s ability to preclude free-riders from 
copying the author’s work for free incentivizes the author to invest in the creation of new 
work). 
19 See WPPT, supra note 9, art. 2(b); New, supra note 3; WIPO Beijing Treaty on Audiovis-
ual Performances Is Concluded, supra note 1. 
2013] The Beijing Treaty and Free Expression 109 
II. Discussion 
 The Beijing Treaty includes a number of new rights for audiovisual 
performers.20 These new rights aim to curb digital piracy by specifically 
enabling performers to sue for digital manipulation or infringement of 
their audiovisual performances, something they could not do under 
previous treaties.21 The rights fall into the same two broad groups as the 
WPPT rights: economic and moral.22 The economic rights include per-
formers’ exclusive right to distribute, reproduce, rent, fix, broadcast, 
and collect revenue for their performances.23 
 The moral rights, on the other hand, allow performers to object to 
modifications of their performances.24 The enforcement of moral 
rights is generally subjective in nature, and allows performers to object 
“to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification . . . that would be 
prejudicial to [the performer’s] reputation.”25 These rights extend to 
individual or institutional heirs to the performer’s rights for as long as 
the economic rights exist.26 But, unlike the economic rights, the moral 
rights stay with performers or their heirs regardless of whether the 
economic rights have been transferred away.27 
 Before the Beijing Treaty, moral rights were not universal, and 
countries differed on defenses, if any, to moral rights claims.28 In 
China, for example, moral rights are protected, but the courts explicitly 
deny fair use defenses against any moral rights claim.29 Because de-
fenses to infringement are almost exclusively limited to the explicit ex-
ceptions from article 22 of the Copyright Law of the People’s Republic 
of China, Chinese courts will not apply fair use or similar defenses to 
                                                                                                                      
20 See Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 5–10; New, supra note 3. 
21 See Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, pmbl.; New, supra note 3. 
22 See Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 5–12. 
23 Id. arts. 7–11. 
24 Id. art. 5. 
25 Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5; Paul Edward Gellar, Copyright History and the Fu-
ture: What’s Culture Got to do With It?, 47 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 209, 261 (1999). 
26 Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5. This is the case unless a party to the Treaty explic-
itly denies protection after a performer’s death. See id. art. 5(2). 
27 Id. art. 5. 
28 See Robert C. Bird & Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Moral Rights in the United States and 
the United Kingdom: Challenges and Opportunities Under the U.K.’s New Performances Regulations, 
24 B.U. Int’l L.J. 213, 227–62 (2006) (examining different approaches taken to moral 
rights in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France). The United States, for ex-
ample, has a very limited moral rights provision. See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing 
Moral Rights, 47 Harv. Int’l L.J. 353, 353 (2006). 
29 Zhiwen Liang, Beyond the Copyright Act: The Fair Use Doctrine Under Chinese Judicial 
Opinions, 56 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 695, 710 (2009). 
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any moral rights claim.30 Other potential defenses, such as parody, are 
also absent from article 22, and ineligible as defenses.31 Thus, if an au-
thor perceives a distortion of his or her work—virtually a requirement 
to create a parody—that author has the right to recover from the dis-
torting user.32 Now, with an international treaty that embraces protec-
tion of these moral rights, performers have international reach to 
prosecute their moral rights subject to limited defenses.33 
III. Analysis 
 The Beijing Treaty’s creation of new rights for performers has far-
reaching implications for the treatment of copyright law.34 While the 
Treaty will help curb digital piracy by granting performers an additional 
level of protection, it comes at the cost of curbing free expression by 
granting performers international moral rights.35 To create the benefit 
of curbing digital piracy without chilling free expression, a defense par-
allel to fair use must exist against moral rights claims.36 Examining pro-
                                                                                                                      
30 See id. at 704; Haochen Sun, Can Louis Vuitton Dance with Hiphone? Rethinking the Idea 
of Social Justice in Intellectual Property Law, 15 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 389, 429 (2012)  
31 See Robert S. Rogoyski & Kenneth Basin, The Bloody Case That Started from a Parody: 
American Intellectual Property and the Pursuit of Democratic Ideals in Modern China, 16 UCLA 
Ent. L. Rev. 237, 238 (2009). This is particularly interesting in light of the fact that Chi-
nese copyright laws are modeled extensively after the United States Copyright Act. Jing 
Zhang, Pushing Copyright Law in China: A Double-Edged Sword, 18 DePaul J. Art Tech. & 
Intell. Prop. 27, 74 (2007). 
32 See Rogoyski & Basin, supra note 31, at 242. 
33 See Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5. 
34 Cf. Michael Gruenberger, A Duty to Protect the Rights of Performers? Constitutional Founda-
tions of an Intellectual Property Right, 24 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 617, 624–30 (2006) (discuss-
ing the change in international copyright by including performers); Haochen Sun, Overom-
ing the Achilles Heel of Copyright Law, 5 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 265, 276 (2007) (stating 
that the WPPT’s creation of new rights updated international copyright law for digital tech-
nology); Carolina Rossini et al., Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances: We Need to Read the 
Fine Print, Elec. Frontier Found. ( July 24, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/ 
07/beijing-treaty-audiovisual-performances (noting many ways treaty could expand copyright 
regime and restrict creative or otherwise legitimate use of content). 
35 See Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, pmbl. (noting the need for protection in digital me-
dia); Bird & Ponte, supra note 28, at 249 (noting opposition in United States copyright 
policy to implementation of moral rights due to chilling effect on expression); WIPO Bei-
jing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances Is Concluded, supra note 1. 
36 See Morrone, supra note 5, at 549 (noting moral rights may chill free expression); cf. 
David S. Olson, First Amendment Interests and Copyright Accommodations, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1393, 
1396–97 (2009) (examining the First Amendment’s purpose in preventing overly restric-
tive copyright); Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 
Cornell L. Rev. 463, 481–82 (2010) (noting that fair use serves as speech protection). 
Other scholars note that moral rights are inherently at odds with moral rights provisions. 
See John W. Gregory, A Necessary Global Discussion for Improvements to U.S. Copyright Law on 
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tection of moral rights and the absence of fair use in the Copyright Law 
of China will illustrate this point.37 
 As stated above, the moral rights provision in the Beijing Treaty 
gives performers the right to stop any work that mutilates or distorts 
their image.38 Without more, it is unclear how far this provision ex-
tends.39 Economic rights, on the other hand, are checked by fair use 
defenses.40 These defenses exist to encourage authors to create new 
works from old works, so long as the new work is sufficiently distinct 
from the original.41 Parody, in particular, relies on using the original 
work to comment on either the author or the underlying work.42 But 
the Beijing Treaty’s moral rights do not have this counter; should per-
formers view a work as morally distasteful, they now can sue.43 
 This problem becomes particularly obvious in light of how fasci-
nated the world is with expression on the internet.44 As some commen-
tators note, video clips and YouTube videos are staples of internet ex-
pression today.45 With these formats, users from all over the world can 
cut existing video to create new works for any number of reasons.46 
                                                                                                                      
Music Sampling, 15 Gonz. J. Int’l L. 72, 101 (2011); Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: 
Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 79, 122 (1996) (arguing 
that without a fair use-like provision, moral rights conflict with the ability of authors to 
create freely). 
37 Cf. Gregory, supra note 36, at 101 (noting tension between moral rights and fair 
use); Liang, supra note 29, at 710 (finding Chinese copyright laws to lack a defense for 
moral rights claims). 
38 See Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5. 
39 See id.; cf. Rothman, supra note 36, at 481–82 (noting role of fair use as protector of 
expression in copyright). 
40 See Copyright Law of China, supra note 5, art. 22; Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 
6–10; Liang, supra note 29, at 701; Sun, supra note 30. 
41 See Olson, supra note 5, at 537 (“[T]he fair use defense to copyright infringement 
. . . allows unauthorized use of copyrighted works under certain circumstances that en-
courage speech and creation of transformative works.”); Rogoyski & Basin, supra note 31, 
at 241–42. Examining the transformative value of the work stems from the United States’ 
influence on Chinese copyright law. See Wang Qian, Is Downloading of Pirated Content for 
Private Purposes a Copyright Infringement in China?, 57 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 655, 656 
(2010); see also Campbell v. Acuff-RoseMusic, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (noting that 
fair use examines how “transformative” a work is when using copyrighted material). 
42 See Rogoyski & Basin, supra note 31. 
43 See Copyright Law of China, supra note 5, art. 10(4); Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5. 
44 See Tarleton Gillespie, Wired Shut: Copyright and the Shape of Digital 
Culture 4 (2007) (noting that the Internet captured the attention and interest of the 
world in the same fashion electricity and hydrogen bomb). 
45 See Rogoyski & Basin, supra note 31, at 255. 
46 See About YouTube, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/t/about_youtube (last visited 
June 2, 2013) (“YouTube allows billions of people to discover, watch and share originally-
created videos. YouTube provides a forum for people to connect, inform, and inspire oth-
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Searching the term “parody” in YouTube will generate millions of vid-
eos from users all over the world.47 
 If performers now have the ability to subjectively decide whether 
new works distort or mutilate their performances, they have the power 
to stop new works from being created on a global scale.48 After all, the 
subjective input of the performer is likely necessary to decide what con-
stitutes “mutilation” of reputation.49 
 It is important to note, however, that providing a fair use type of 
defense to moral rights claims in the Beijing Treaty will not harm per-
formers’ international protection.50 Fair use defenses exist to promote 
the creation of new work, not provide an escape hatch to infringing 
parties.51 Many fair use provisions for economic rights, for example, 
require the secondary author overcome a set of hurdles to justify using 
                                                                                                                      
ers across the globe and acts as a distribution platform for original content creators and 
advertisers large and small.”). 
47. See Parody Search Results, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com (search “parody”) 
(last visited June 2, 2013). Searching for a parody of the popular song “Gangnam Style” on 
YouTube, for example, generates about 838,000 results. Gangnam Style Parody Search 
Results, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com (search “gangnam style parody”) (last visited 
June 2, 2013). Parodying this particular video is so popular, news outlets compiled top ten 
lists of “favorite” parodies. See, e.g., Richard James, Top Ten Gangnam Style Parodies of 2012, 
Metro (Dec. 21, 2012, 4:05 PM) http://metro.co.uk/2012/12/21/top-ten-gangnam-style-
parodies-of-2012-3313788/. 
48 See Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5; Gellar, supra note 25. 
49 See Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5; Heidi Hansen Kalscheur, About “Face”: Using 
Moral Rights to Increase Copyright Enforcement in China, 39 Hastings Const. L.Q. 513, 532 
(2012); Vera Zlatarski, “Moral” Rights and Other Moral Interests: Public Art Law in France, Rus-
sia, and the United States, 23 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 201, 217 (1999). 
50 Cf. Copyright Law of China, supra note 5, arts. 10, 22 (protecting moral rights for any 
copyright holder); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 
Colum. L. Rev. 1177, 1191 (2000) (noting that several factors that U.S. courts use in examin-
ing fair use examine the economic or market harm to the original author before granting 
fair use); Jill I. Prater, When Museums Act Like Gift Shops: The Discordant Derivative Works Excep-
tion to the Termination Clause, 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 97, 113–14 (“The economic interests of the 
artist are preserved through the four fair use factors enumerated in § 107, and the concept of 
the transformation of copyrighted works into a secondary use with artistic or economic value 
of its own is consistent with the fundamental policy of protecting the artist’s monopoly inter-
est in her work, and maintaining incentives to create.”); Jeannine M. Marques, Note, Fair Use 
in the 21st Century: Bill Graham and Blanch v. Koons, 22 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 331, 340 (2007) 
(noting that courts in the United States examine the amount of economic harm a transfor-
mative work creates before protecting granting fair use). Compare Copyright Law of China, 
supra note 5, art. 22 (fair uses of copyrighted material), with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (fair uses of 
copyrighted material). 
51 See Prater, supra note 50, at 113–14. 
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the original work.52 This ensures that the secondary author’s use of the 
original work is for creating something new, not merely free-riding off 
the original.53 
 But without any fair use-like defense, performers’ monopoly over 
their moral rights is seemingly limitless.54 China’s Copyright Law dem-
onstrates the effect of denying a fair use defense against moral rights 
claims.55 Even parody, which is not traditionally recognized as a fair use 
in China, provides no protection for secondary authors creating any 
work that may “mutilate or distort” the image of the original author.56 
But, if the purpose of a fair use or parody defense is to promote creativ-
ity and new works, the law cannot serve copyright policy through a 
moral rights provision where the performer is given complete control 
and secondary authors lose an important source of creative input and 
output.57 
 For the Beijing Treaty to fully serve global copyright policy, its 
moral rights provision must be countered with a fair use provision.58 
The call for fair use protection against moral rights is not new, but now 
                                                                                                                      
52 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). In the United States, for example, the secondary au-
thor must show that her new work is not an infringement of the original work by through 
an examination of: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes (2) the nature of 
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
Id. 
53 See Stephen M. McJohn Fair Use of Copyrighted Software, 28 Rutgers L.J. 593, 604 
(1997) (noting that failure to overcome the hurdles of fair use will require the secondary 
author to seek permission from the original author). 
54 See Liang, supra note 29, at 701. 
55 Cf. Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 263, 265 (2009) (arguing 
moral rights endanger art in general); Morrone, supra note 5, at 549 (“Thus, many secon-
dary authors who do not run afoul of traditional copyright law may chill their expression 
and choose not to publish out of fear of offending new moral rights standards.”). 
56 See Copyright Law of China, supra note 5, arts. 10, 22; Rogoyski & Basin, supra note 
31, at 243–44. 
57 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575–90 (finding parodies promote creativity); see also 
Geller, supra note 25, at 261; Prater, supra note 50, at 113–14 ; Zlatarski, supra note 49 at 
203. 
58 Cf. Matthew J. McDonough, Moral Rights and the Movies: The Threat and Challenge of 
the Digital Domain, 31 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 455, 477 (1997) (arguing movie studios would 
object to moral rights for film makers due to the likely flood of litigation); Yonover, supra 
note 36, at 110 (“Thus, when moral rights, ‘honor or reputation,’ are at risk this monopoly 
might be used to prevent or chill the critic/parodist.”). 
114 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 36:E. Supp. 
this problem expands to a global level.59 Without the fair use defense to 
counter a performer’s moral right, the purpose of copyright laws will 
be undermined.60 The goal of curbing digital piracy will come at the 
cost of free expression.61 
Conclusion 
 Copyright laws are designed to promote innovation and the crea-
tion of new works. The Beijing Treaty, however, which lacks any specific 
defense to a moral rights claim, will give performers international 
reach to sue for any expression they find subjectively offensive. When 
moral rights granted by the Beijing Treaty are pursued in countries 
without counterbalancing fair use protection, the moral rights provi-
sion will curb the free expression that copyright laws are supposed to 
foster. 
                                                                                                                      
59 Cf. Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5 (providing international protection and reach 
for performers’ moral rights); Adler, supra note 55, at 265 (arguing moral rights endanger 
art in general); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension 
of the Artistic Soul, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1945, 1988 (2006) (noting the interest in First 
Amendment protection as justification for limiting moral rights); Eric M. Brooks, Com-
ment, “Tilted” Justice: Site-Specific Art and Moral Rights After U.S. Adherence to the Berne Conven-
tion, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 1431, 1482 (1989) (arguing that moral rights can be implemented 
so long as they are checked by an interest in the public welfare). 
60 See Liang, supra note 29, at 701. 
61 See Beijing Treaty, supra note 2, pmbl.; Morrone, supra note 5, at 549. 
